Dealing with corporate defaulters: curbing the unfettered exercise of criminal law by Davis, Dennis M
Dealing with corporate defaulters: Curbing
the unfettered exercise of criminal law
DENNIS M DAVIS*
The 1973 Companies Act used the criminal law extensively to enforce
numerous provisions of the Act. This process of criminalisation proved
ineffective and many provisions of the Act were honoured in the breach rather
than the compliance. The drafters of the 2008 Act, following comparative
precedent, sought to decriminalise the enforcement mechanisms contained in
the Act by introducing a complaint procedure to be investigated by a newly
created Companies Commission or the Takeover Panel, as well as introducing
compliance notices. This paper examines the international trend to remove
criminal sanctions from company law and to introduce alternative means of
enforcement. It then proceeds to evaluate the new measures contained in the
2008 Act.
I INTRODUCTION
A primary goal of new company law will be to ensure that through a
proper system of corporate governance, disclosure and exposure to
market forces, wrongdoing will be discouraged and punished. Tradition-
ally, company laws have left the enforcement of their provisions to
shareholders, the liquidator in winding-up, and the Director of Public
Prosecutions. Experience has shown that these methods of enforcement
are inherently defective.'
Professor Baxt, who was a representative to the Australian Law Reform
Commission, said the following while arguing in favour of decriminalisa-
tion of company law:
If I were rewriting the Companies Act I would decriminalize a lot of it. I think
that there are far too many criminal penalties in areas where there should not
be. I query why you want criminal penalties in some of the situations where
there are not major problems ie: failure to file accounts etc.
He says:
Certainly you can penalize them monetarily but keep the criminal element
out of it.2
* BCom, LLB (UCT), MPhil (Cambridge). Honorary Professor in Conunercial Law at the
University of Cape Town, Judge of the Western Cape High Court and Judge President of the
Competition Appeal Court in South Africa.
I The Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa South African Company Law Reform for
the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (May 2004) at 45.
2 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Company Directors' Duties: Report by the
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (November 1989) ch 13 at 189.
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In its 2004 policy paper, the Department of Trade and Industries
proposed, as an important issue for review, that an examination be
instituted concerning the appropriate balance to be struck between civil,
criminal and administrative sanctions. The reason for this recommenda-
tion was that the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was replete with provisions
which imposed criminal penalties, whereas alternative remedies such as
civil or administrative penalties were too easily eschewed within the
legislative scheme.
The policy paper recognised that the decriminalisation of company law
could not take place simply by way of a straight replacement of criminal
law with the imposition of personal liability on directors. Such enforce-
ment, while potentially effective, would impose excessive burdens upon
shareholders and liquidators who would then be faced with the ultimate
burden of enforcement. For this reason, the policy document went on to
state:
While the continued role of criminal and civil courts in company law
enforcement is not questioned, there is also a need for a body with the power
to issue administrative orders and impose fines to ensure the quick resolution
of some commercial matters, especially those relating to mergers and take-
overs. Thus, a combination of criminal, civil and administrative remedies
should be introduced. In addition, measures to disqualify persistent violators
from access to public markets and to promote dispute resolution will be
considered. 3
The policy document therefore squarely faced the question of the costs
and benefits of employing criminal as opposed to non-criminal measures
of enforcement. Even if the benefits of employment of criminal law
exceeded the costs, it was contended that various civil and administrative
regulatory measures could prove to be either more effective or less costly
than the employment of criminal sanctions. In the first place, non-
criminal measures may not be subject to the strict procedural require-
ments which are applied to criminal statutes, now buttressed further by a
vast body of related constitutional jurisprudence. Secondly, the traditional
criminal law requirements ofproof ofa culpable mental state, the mens rea,
often constitutes an insurmountable evidential burden for the prosecuting
agency whereas the imposition of strict liability may itself be the subject of
constitutional challenge. Furthermore, non-criminal procedures may be
better adapted to controlling and regulating violations of a continuing
nature. Thus, an interdict procedure which employs a pattern of proof of
misconduct to formulate a rule which is tailored specifically to the
possibility of future conduct together with the censure triggered by
3Op cit (n 1) 46.
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contempt proceedings may, each time that the order is violated, be a more
effective measure than the employment of more burdensome criminal
law mechanisms.
4
In addition as Tomasic has noted:
Corporate regulatory authorities have for a variety of reasons had difficulty in
dealing with corporate crime as 'crime' and have instead tended to deal with
such misconduct in more genteel ways. This is often a very pragmatic decision
made as a result of the nature of corporate crime and the difficulties of dealing
with such conduct through a legal system that has been based on a model of
criminality that is more attuned to what might be described as street crime.
Courts have tended to leave the internal governance of corporations to be
dealt with within the company through its various organs, such as by the
ratification of conduct by an adequately informed general meeting or by the
board of directors, and have therefore tended to be reluctant to intervene in
internal corporate matters except where there was a clear case of fraud or
illegality. It could also be argued that we have two cultures of criminal law and
that only one of these is comfortably handled by the criminaljustice system.5
As Bauchus and Dworkin have contended, much of the analysis of
corporate clients' crime tends to blur an important distinction between
corporate crime and illegal corporate behaviour, in that not all illegal
corporate behaviour is criminal.
6
There is also a temptation to diminish the importance of the use of
administrative penalties and civil action in the context of corporate
activities because of the weaknesses of the regulatory system, all to often
underfunded and not staffed with sufficient expertise to impose an
adequate regulatory supervision on potential corporate offences. Absent
such difficulties, this problem would be more appropriately dealt with by
way of non-criminal sanctions. In this connection, the caution of Luca
and Volpin is relevant:
Another type of regulatory intervention is enforcement of corporate and
security laws through a supervisory agencies and criminal sanctions. Little
evidence exists that public enforcement matters_. Yet public enforcement may
be the most effective tool to prevent specific forms of expropriation, for
4 See in general N Morris and G Hawkins The Honest Politician's Guide to Crine Control
(1970).
1 Tomasic 'Corporate Collapse, Crime and Governance - Enron, Anderson and Beyond'
(2002) 14 AustralianJournal of Corporate Law 1 at 7.
6 Op cit, cited by Tomasic Corporate Crime and Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies
Australia: Centrefor National Corporate Law research discussion paper 1/1993 at 3.
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example insider trading, which are otherwise hard to detect. It may also be
needed to impose sufficiently severe sanctions like prison terms in extreme
cases.
7
Significantly for the purposes of the analyses of the 2008 Companies
Act the authors consider, in their view, three other more effective legal
tools including: strength in internal governance mechanisms, empower-
ing shareholders by granting them the rights to sue the company's
directors and by empowering shareholders through ensuring that they
have a role in key corporate governance decisions by means of an
extension of subject matters to be decided at the shareholders meeting,
the provision of super majority requirements, in relation to key decisions,
lowering the costs of voting and the mandating of minority shareholder
representatives on the board. Further, the authors recommend enhancing
disclosure requirements, shareholders rights to sell, vote and sue which is
effectively exercised only when such a constituency has adequate access to
information. Thus, an extensive regime of disclosure may help alleviate
agencies problems and listed companies or as Brandeis so famously said:
'Sunshine is the best disinfectant'. 8
II COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE
Before canvassing the legislative response to the policy document, it is
instructive to examine, albeit briefly, some relevant comparative applica-
tion of criminal law to corporate activity.
The United Kingdom's Steering Committee on Company Law
Review found that a criminal sanction would remain appropriate where
the wrongdoing may prove difficult to detect and there was little
incentive for private litigation. In addition, it was important that:
the criminal sanction be proportionate to the effect of the prohibited: if not an
excessive sanction will meet with judicial resistance. For this reason, it is
suggested that it would be inappropriate to attach a criminal penalty to the
directors' duty of loyalty or to the prohibition against financial assistance. 9
After the report carefully considered the use of civil sanctions it
concluded:
An example of a civil sanction with an efficient deterrent effect is the
'prophylactic' rule which strips a fiduciary of his profit if he acts (without
appropriate authority) where there is a conflict between his interest and duty.
' E Luca and P Volpin 'Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe' (2007) 21
Journal of Economic Perspectives 117.
Cited by Luca et al supra (n 8) 126.
9 United Kingdom Steering Group on Company Law Review Modern Company Law for a
Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (London, DTI, 2000) ch 13 at 296.
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The sanction thus goes beyond giving the injured party compensation for loss;
it is justified in this case because of difficulties of detection and risks of
enforcement error. 1 0
This approach mirrored an earlier Australian report, which had noted
that:
(i) criminal sanctions were perceived as too draconian since these often
included custodial sentences, which may not be appropriate;
(ii) courts were reluctant to impose imprisonment as a penalty and instead
imposed modest fines that gave the appearance that the law was weak;
and
(iii) the criminal standard of proof made it very difficult for the contravention
to be publicly enforced.II
Consequently, in Australia, a new category of sanctions were intro-
duced known as 'civil penalties' to supplement the traditional criminal
sanctions. Under the Australian Corporations Act 2001, criminal sanc-
tions are imposed only when the contravention is accompanied by
dishonest intent or recklessness. A civil penalty provision is enforced by
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission '(ASIC)' where a
civil standard of proof is employed. The civil penalty provision was first
introduced to help enforce compliance of duties of directors, but it has
since been expanded to cover failure to comply with the statutory
requirement to keep financial records and reports, a prohibition against
insolvent trading, the provision of financial benefits to related parties,
share capital transactions, duties imposed on those involved in the
management of managed investment schemes and market misconduct
provisions which include the continuous disclosure obligation, market
manipulation, insider trading, false trading, market rigging and dissemina-
tion of information about illegal transactions.12
The remedies available for the authorities in the event of a contraven-
tion are:
(i) a pecuniary order (ie payment of a sum of money to ASIC);
(ii) a compensation order for the corporation; or
(iii) a disqualification order.
In addition to the civil penalties under the Australian Corporations Act,
2001, the ASIC may also initiate public interest litigation under s 50 of the
10 Ibid.
" Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Company Directors'Duties:
Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors (November 1989)
AGPS, Canberra.
12 G Gilligan, H Bird and I Ramsay 'Regulating Directors' Duties: How Effective are the
Civil Penalty Sanctions in the Australian Corporations Law?' University of Melbourne Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 156.
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Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, if it appears
to the ASIC that it is in the interests of the public for a company to sue a
director to recover compensation from the director who has breached his
duty.
More recently, the Corporate Law Reform Committee of the Compa-
nies Comnission of Malaysia examined the use of criminal sanctions in
terms of the Malaysian Companies Act of 1966. In dealing particularly
with directors' duties, the report concluded the following:
(a) A contravention of the statutory provisions on directors' duties
should be enforced by a range of sanctions comprising of criminal
sanctions enforceable by initiating criminal proceedings and/or civil
penalty proceedings.
(b) Criminal sanctions for the contravention of director's duties should
be imposed where the contravention is accompanied by fraud or
dishonesty. Where there is no fraud or dishonesty, the contravention
should be criminalised.
(c) Where there is no fraud or dishonesty in relation to the contraven-
tion of the legislative provision on directors' duties, the regulator
should be empowered to bring civil penalty proceedings.
(d) The regulator should be given a general power to initiate civil
proceedings on behalf of the company if it appears that it is in the
interest of the public to do so.
(e) Criminal sanctions should still be generally used to ensure compli-
ance with the obligation to disclose but not all failures to comply
with any procedural requirements should give rise to criminal
sanctions. 13
Broadening its enquiry to the possible use of criminal sanctions to other
areas of company law, the Malaysian Commission found that:
(a) in cases where a contravention involves fraud or deliberate wrong-
doing or dishonesty, the criminal sanctions should be imposed on
officers involved in the contravention and not the company.
14
(b) In the case of non-compliance with procedural requirements, the
criminal liability on the company should be removed where there
are meaningful and alternative sanctions available on individuals
who are involved in the contravention.
1 5
In summary, recourse to the record in these jurisdictions reveals that
the treatment of criminal sanctions for breaches of company law should be
13 Corporate Law Reform Committee for the Companies Commission of Malaysia A
Consultative Document on the Review of Criminal, Civil and Administrative Sanctions in the Companies
Act 1965, at 36. Available at http://www.ssm.com.my/clrc/CD11.pdf.
14 Op cit (n 14) 39.
15 Opcit (n 14) 40.
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addressed by a forensic examination of the scope for criminal offences to
be included effectively in legislation which deals with company law and
the balance to be struck between the employment of the potentially
draconian criminal justice mechanism and non-carceral techniques of
enforcement. In turn that drives the enquiry towards an analysis of the
conduct that may need regulation.
In short, the following categories of conduct focus attention on the
possible justification for the concomitant sanction:
(a) criminal dishonesty, ie sanctions for offences where dishonest intent
needs to be proved;
(b) should criminal law employed for offences where dishonesty is likely
but the law merely forbids commission, usually knowingly, of an act
that breaches a provision in the legislation which has more than
merely procedural significance and which may be regarded as raising
a presumption of dishonesty (such as a director authorising a transac-
tion in which he or she has an interest);
(c) similarly, should criminal sanction be used for a procedural or minor
regulatory obligations such as the filing of documents;
(d) administrative penalty could be used where a civil penalty is imposed
by the act of a public authority for non-compliance with a legislative
provision;
(e) civil (private) action can be brought by ordinary stakeholders,
whether they are minority shareholders, employees, or creditors.16
From this categorisation, it follows that there is a need to examine the
potential application of differing forms of enforcement for different forms
of conduct. These can be broken down as follows:
(a) specific enforcement; that is, action to compel actual implementa-
tion of a requirement in a specific case, as distinct from generally
applicable sanctions;
(b) naming and shaming; arrangements for increasing the effectiveness
of sanctions by drawing attention to breaches of the law; and
(c) persons who should be held liable in criminal law and, in particular,
the liability of companies and the officers of the company including
directors, managers, employees, and professional advisers.
17
III RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN INITIATIVES: 2008 ACT
Taking this categorisation of conduct and the consequent potential range
sanctions into account, a return can be made to South African company
law by way of a comparison between the 1973 Act and the 2008 Act.
16 Op cit (n 10) 414.
17 Op cit (n 10) 415.
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(1) The Companies Act 61 of 1973
Under the 1973 Act, the legislation was replete with criminal offences.
Briefly stated, the position can be summarised thus: s 161 of the 1973 Act
read with ss 143 to 149, s 153, s 156 and s 162 imposed criminal liability
for a range of activities relating to the offer of shares to the public, to the
contents of the prospectus, the registration and issue of the prospectus and
untrue statements contained therein.
Section 189 imposed criminal liability on directors or officers who
breached provisions relating to Chapter XI of the Act, which contained a
series of provisions relating to proxies, the production of accounting
records and financial statements. Section 425 of the Act incorporated
specific offences under the Insolvency Act.
Sections 234 to 241 governed the position of a director with a direct or
indirect interest in significant contracts entered into by the company of
which he or she was a director. These provisions thus imposed an
obligation upon such a director to disclose these interests; failure to so do
could be met with a criminal sanction. Sections 249, 250 and 251
imposed criminal liability for acts that related to the falsification of
rewards as well as the suppression of records, documents, certificates and
similar evidence.
In addition, the company could be held criminally liable for a failure to
comply with the formal requirement of respecting names, the misuse of
the company seal, failure to comply with the registrar's request for
amended articles, and a failure to provide a member with a copy of the
memorandum of articles.
This brief summary reveals the manner in which the 1973 Act made
extensive use of criminal law. Its employment was undertaken in a
haphazard and unsystematic way, without any recourse to the core
purpose of the imposed sanction or the significance of the provision,
non-compliance with which could be visited with a criminal sanction.
(2) The Companies Act 71 of 2008
The 2008 Act has radically reduced the use and scope of criminal law.
Sanctions are employed, in essence, where the Act seeks to strengthen the
other tools which can ensure governance of the corporation, such as the
provision of adequate information to all applicable stakeholders. Thus, in
ternis of s 26, it is an offence to fail to provide access to the member's
register or to the minute books. Similarly, the importance of information
to stakeholders is strengthened, in that the offences relating to the making
of false statements and falsification of books or records have all been
incorporated into the new Act. The use of criminal law relating to the
protection of financial statements has also been retained.
In certain instances, the Act has relied exclusively on the common law
of fraud to provide the sanction; for example forgery of security certifi-
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cates. Significant changes have been introduced to the regime governing
the liability of directors, where the concept of a sanction shifts from the
use of criminal law to the imposition of civil liability upon the individual
director of the company. But there are some innovations which are even
more important in tilting the emphasis away from the employment of
criminal law. It is to these that the analysis must turn.
(a) Compliance notices
The most novel feature of the 2008 Act is the introduction of a compli-
ance notice provision. A newly established Companies and Intellectual
Property Commission '(CIPC)', or in the case of a takeover, the Takeover
Regulation Panel '(TRP)' may issue a compliance notice in the pre-
scribed form to any person, whom the CIPC/TRP, on reasonable
grounds, believes has:
* contravened the Act; or
* assented to, was implicated in, or directly or indirectly benefited
from, a contravention of the act unless the alleged contravention
could otherwise be addressed in terms of the Act by an application to
a court. 18
A compliance notice may require the person to whom it is addressed to:
* cease, correct or reverse any action in contravention of the Act;
" take any action mandated by the Act;
" restore assets or their value to a company or any other person;
" provide a community service, in the case of a CIPC notice or
* take any other steps reasonably related to the contravention and
designed to rectify its effect. 19
When the compliance notice is issued, the CIPC or the executive
director of the panel must send a copy of the notice to the regulatory
authority which granted a licence or similar authority to the entity, in
terms of which that person was authorised to conduct business.
A compliance notice indicates the person or the association to whom
the notice applies, the provisions of the Act which have been contra-
vened, the details and nature and extent of the non-compliance, any steps
that are required to be taken, the period in which those steps must be
taken and the penalty that may be imposed if the steps contained in the
compliance notice are not so taken.
Given the importance of the compliance notice, a person issued with
such a notice may apply, in terms of s 172 of the Act, to the Companies
Tribunal, in the case of a notice issued by the Commission, or to the Take
18 Section 171(1) of the 2008 Act.
19 Section 171(2) of the 2008 Act.
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Over Special Committee, in the case of a notice issued by the executive
director of the panel, or to a court, in either case, for a review of the notice
within2° a specified period. The Tribunal or the Special Comiittee or a
court can confirm, modify or cancel all or part of the compliance notice.
2 1
The compliance notice remains in force until it is set aside by either:
* the Companies Tribunal, or a court (in the case of a CIPC notice), or
the Take-over Special Committee, or a court (in the case of TRP
Executive Director notice); or
* the CIPC or TRP Executive Director; or
* the CIPC or TRP Executive Director issues a compliance certifi-
cate 22 to the effect that there has been compliance with the require-
ments of the notice.
23
If a matter has been investigated and the CIPC and the respondent have
agreed to a resolution of the compliant, the CIPC may record the
resolution in the form of an order. If the person which or who is the
subject of the complaint consents to that order, the CIPC may apply to
the High Court to have it confirmed as a consent order, in terms of its
rules. 24 The court, on application by the CIPC or TRP may impose an
administrative fine for a failure to comply with a compliance notice. The
fine may not be more than the greater of 10 per cent of the company's
turnover for the period during which the company failed to comply with
the compliance notice and the maximum prescribed by the Minister; the
minimum so prescribed being R1 million.
25
It is significant that in providing for an administrative fine for non-
compliance with the notice, s 175(2) of the Act specifies the factors to be
taken into account in the determination of an appropriate administrative
fine. These include:
(a) The nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention;
(b) Any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention;
(c) The behaviour of the respondent;
(d) The market circumstances in which the contravention took place;
(e) The level of profit derived from the contravention;
69 The degree to which the respondent co-operated with the comnis-
sion or panel or the court; and
(g) Whether the respondent had previously been found to be in contra-
vention of the Act.
20 Section 172 of the 2008 Act.
21 Section 172(1) of the 2008 Act.
2 Section 171 (5) of the 2008 Act.
23 Section 171 (6) of the 2008 Act.
24 Section 173(1) of the 2008 Act.
2 Section 175(5) of the 2008 Act.
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In summary, the 2008 Act has dispensed with the almost blanket
employment by the 1973 Act of criminal sanctions and has replaced this
blunt system with numerous targeted sanctions, in particular administra-
tive fines, subject to careful guidance as to the appropriate factors to be
taken into account in the imposition of such fines. Further, the fine
becomes the ultimate sanction, in that a breach of the applicable provi-
sions of the Act are first visited with a compliance notice which, in turn,
provides the commission or the Take Over Panel with an opportunity to
ensure the enforcement of the Act, without the necessity of instituting a
prosecution with all the analysed attendant difficulties.
A further initiative to promote the objects of decrininalisation can be
seen in the four alternatives for addressing complaints regarding alleged
contraventions of the Act or for the enforcement of a provision of a right,
whether sourced in terms of the Act or in the Company's Memorandum
of Incorporation or in terms of its rules.
26
An aggrieved party can;
(1) Attempt to resolve the dispute, using alternative dispute resolution
procedures;
(2) Apply to the Companies Tribunal for adjudication, but only in
respect of any matter for which such an application is permitted in
the Act;
(3) Apply to the High Court for appropriate relief; or
(4) File a complaint with the commission.
As an alternative to an application to court or the lodging of a
compliant to a commission, the complainant may refer the matter to the
Companies Tribunal or to an accredited entity for resolution by media-
tion, conciliation or arbitration. 27 In terms of s 166(3) of the Act, an
accredited entity is considered to be a juristic person or an association of
persons which meets the criteria presented by the Minister and has been
so accredited. The commission may also accredit such a body over which
it is given monitoring powers.
(b) Further innovation
There are two further provisions which require comment in this connec-
tion. The first concerns an extended power of standing to apply for
remedial relief under the Act. An application can be made by any person
directly affected by an act of the company, by a person acting on behalf of
any person directly so affected who cannot act in his or her own name,
persons acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of
26 Section 156 of the 2008 Act.
27 Section 166(1) of the 2008 Act.
422 MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
affected persons, an association acting in the interest of its members or
persons acting in the public interest with the leave of the court.
2 8
In this connection, the Act, by way of an extension of standing has
followed the provisions of s 38 of the Constitution 29 which radically
extending a restrictive regime of standing provided for in the common
law, which, in essence, compelled an applicant to show a personal and
direct interest in the case. The locus classicus is the decision in Patz v Greene
& Co. 30
Secondly, in terms of s 166 of the Act, it is clear that the new legislation
envisages the possibility of a process of conciliation, mediation or arbitra-
tion to resolve a particular dispute. It appears that the other party must
agree to the use of this alternative resolution process and that neither the
tribunal nor the accredited entity possesses compulsory jurisdiction in
terms of s 166. If the tribunal or an accredited entity to whom a matter has
been referred for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) concludes that
either party is a not participating in good faith or that there is no
reasonable probability of the parties resolving the dispute raised during
the process, it issues a certificate in the prescribed form stating that the
process has failed.
31
Assume, however, that the complainant eschews the ADR alternative.
In terms of s 156(b) of the Act, such a person, seeking to address an alleged
contravention of the Act or to enforce rights under the Act or the
memorandum or rules, has the option of applying for one of the remedies
contained in a menu of adjudication options as set out in this provision.
The tribunal, if chosen, is then obliged to conduct proceedings to
determine the outcome of the complaint in accordance with natural
justice but, as set out in s 180(2), the proceedings are designed to be less
formal than those in a court. Provision is, however, made for the parties to
participate through a representative if they so choose. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the presiding member will issue a decision together with
written reasons for that decision.
IV CONCLUSION
The use of criminal law in the context of company law remains an
important element in the enforcement of key provisions of the Act. Given
the increasing concern for governance and accountability of a company to
stakeholders whose interests are inextricably linked to the fortunes of the
company, viable enforcement mechanisms are important. Where, for
example there is a breach of the duty of loyalty by directors, litigation
28 Section 157(1) of the 2008 Act.
29 Act 108 of 1996.
10 1907 TS 427 at 433 to 435.
" Section 166(2) of the 2008 Act.
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which is initiated to hold recalcitrant directors accountable to their legal
mandate invariably become extremely costly. An element of public
enforcement may then be the only appropriate and viable means of
ensuring that key provisions of the Act are not honoured only in the
breach. Restitutionary remedies may provide incentives for shareholders
to launch civil actions, thereby reducing the need for criminal penalties,
but the incentive may be unlikely to consistently trump the problem of
cost of litigation.
To be sure, criminal sanctions hold their own problems. A criminal
prosecution triggers off the possibility of a range of constitutional chal-
lenges by an accused. In turn, this can prolong the trial and cause
proceedings to be even more complex. Further, in South Africa there is a
paucity of commercial prosecutorial expertise to run complex commer-
cial criminal trials efficiently.
For these reasons, the 2008 Act contains only seven offence sections,
although s 214(3) is extremely wide, being central to the enforcement in
that it makes it an offence to disregard a compliance notice. It may be
argued that s 214 of the Act, which underpins the compliance regime, is,
in substance, a substitute for many of the criminal provisions that were
contained in the 1973 Act. But the criminal sanction then becomes a
mechanism of last resort. However, as noted, the criminal penalty is
targeting at key provisions which are designed to promote accountable
corporate governance. Table 1 appended to this paper eloquently illus-
trates the attempt to move from a scatter gun to a laser instrument.
The new established supervisory bodies, the Companies Commission
and the Takeover Panel, are vested with key enforcement powers, while
the ultimate sanction for non-compliance with their orders remains a
criminal penalty. Thus a corporation which breaches an order risks the
censure of these supervisory bodies. In this way, the Act seeks to introduce
an important element of administrative supervision upon recalcitrant
corporations. If the legislative design succeeds the criminal law will be
used, as it should be, sparingly and where the prosecution of offenders
holds a realistic possibility of success.
TABLE I
South Africa Companies Act
Comparison of Enforcement Provisions
1973 1973 Act Offence 2008 Companies Act
Companies Act
15A(4) Violation of ministerial order not to No comparable ministerial power
disclose information concerning the
company
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1973 1973 Act Offence 2008 Companies Act
Companies Act
37(2A) Failure by director or officer to take No comparable requirement
reasonable steps to ensure company
compliance with requirements to
disclose loans by the company to its
holding company or sibling subsid-
iary
38(3A) Company director or officer con- Directors who approve any such
travention of prohibition of loans loan without required shareholder
for subscription of company's shares approval are personally liable to the
company: s 44, read with
s 77(3) (e)(iv).
46 Failure to comply with registrar's Companies Tribunal will now issue
order to change company name such orders, which may be filed in
the High Court as a court order,
and enforced accordingly:
s 160, read with s 195(8)
49 Failure by company to comply with Commission is authorised to add
formal requirements respecting the appropriate formal elements to
names the company's name on registra-
tion: s 11 (3), read with s 14(2) (a)
50(3) Misuse of company seal, etc by Enforced by personal liability:
director or officer s 32(6) and (7)
50(4) Failure by company to put its name An offence: s 32(1) to (5)
on things
58(2) Failure by company to comply with Comparable power to request is
registrar's request for amended enforceable through compliance
Articles notice system: s 17(5) (b), read with
ss 171 (1) (a) and (7), and 214(3).
67(2) Failure by company to provide An offence: s 26(1)(a) and (6)
member with a copy of the Memo-
randum and Articles
80 Failure by company, director or No comparable filing requirements
officer to satisfy filing requirements
related to connissions paid on sub-
scription of shares
81 Failure by company, director or No comparable section
officer to satisfy prospectus require-
ments relating to discounted shares
91A Unauthorised actions relating to Comparable prohibitions are
uncertificated securities enforced through personal liability,
and may also be enforced through
the compliance notice system: s 53,
read with s 55.
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1973 1973 Act OfTence 2008 Companies Act
Companies Act
93(5) Failure by company, director or No separate requirements respect-
officer to satisfy requirements con- ing allotments. Company is
ceming register of allotments of required to maintain securities reg-
shares ister in prescribed form. Failure is
enforceable through compliance
notice system.
96 Failure by company, director or No comparable time limit. Corn-
officer to satisfy formal require- pany is required to issue shares upon
ments relating to issuance of shares receipt of consideration for them.
after subscription Enforceable through compliance
notice system, and also through
civil court proceedings
98(5)(b) Failure by company to comply with No comparable filing requirement
requirements to notify registrar of
redemption of preference shares
102 Failure by company, director or No comparable filing requirement
officer to satisfy requirements to
notify registrar of court consent to
an action by dissenting shareholder
concerning variable shares
112 Failure to comply with any of 5 Company is required to maintain
sections concerning register of securities register in prescribed
members form. Failure is enforceable through
compliance notice system:
s 24(4)(a), read with s 50
113 Failure by company, director or An offence for the company
officer to satisfy requirements only: s 26(1)(a) and (6)
respecting access to members' regis-
ter
131 Failure by company to comply with No separate debentures register
3 sections respecting debentures required. Debentures included in
register definition of 'securities', and in
requirements to maintain securities
register in prescribed form.
Enforced by compliance notice
system. s 50
132 Forgery of securities certificates and No comparable provision. Criminal
impersonation of shareholder for prohibition of forgery or fraud
purposes of obtaining securities applies.
certificate
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139 Failure to comply with requirement No comparable option to refuse a
to issue notice of refusal to transfer transfer. Regulations respecting
securities maintenance ofsecurities register
should amplify this topic. Enforce-
able through compliance notice
system, and civil courts
140 Failure by company, director or No comparable provision respect-
officer to satisfy formal time ing time for transfer. Regulations
requirements relating to transfer of respecting maintenance of securities
shares register should amplify this topic.
Enforceable through compliance
notice system, and civil courts
141(8) Failure to comply with require- Comparable provisions are enforce-
143 ments concerning offers of shares able through compliance system, or








162(1) Untrue statements in prospectuses Enforced through liability: ss 104 to
162(2) 106
164 Failure by company, director or Comparable provisions are enforce-
165 officer to comply with require- able through compliance system:
166(2) ments respecting allotments ss 107 to 111
168(3)
169(5)(a)
170(4) Failure to comply with require- Comparable provisions are enforce-
ments respecting registered office able through compliance system:
s 23
171(2) Failure to comply with requirement No comparable requirement
to list directors' names on company
correspondence
172(7) Prohibition on doing business No provision for such a certificate is
before receiving a certificate to made in this Act.
commence business
179(5) Failure by company, director or Requirement to hold meeting is
officer to comply with requirement enforceable by court order:
to hold annual meeting, or with a s 61(12).
direction by registrar to convene
such a meeting
181(6) Failure by director or officer to Comparable provisions enforceable
convene a meeting when required by court order: s 61(2), (3) and (12)
by shareholders
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185 Failure by company, director or Comparable provisions enforceable
186(4) officer to comply with require- by compliance notice or civil pro-
189(2)(b) ments respecting notice of meet- ceedings in court: s 62
189(4)(a) ings, circulation of resolutions,
189(7) exercise of proxy rights, adjourn-
192 ment of meetings
200(5) Failure to satisfy requirement to No comparable filing requirement.
200(6) circulate and file special resolution Shareholders' right of access to reso-
with the registrar lutions is generally addressed at s 26.
204 Failure to comply with require- Comparable requirements are
ments to keep minute books enforceable through compliance
notice system: s 24(3)(d).
206 Company, director or officer failure An offence for the company
to comply with requirements to only: s 24(3)(d), read with
grant access to minute books s 26(1)(a) and (6)
207(2) Failure to comply with obligation No comparable specific obligation
for 'fair reporting' of meetings
211(6) Failure by pre-incorporation direc- There is no comparable require-
tors to subscribe shares and sign ment for pre-incorporation direc-
consent to serve, and for post-in- tors to subscribe shares. The
corporation directors to sign con- requirement that directors must
sent to serve have consented to serve is enforced
by the fact that they become direc-
tors only when their consent has
been deposited with the company.
Without a signed consent, they are
not directors. There is no require-
ment to file consents, but the com-
pany must file a notice of every
change in director. The regulations
could require the filing of the con-
sent as part of that notice. The filing
requirements are enforceable
through the compliance notice
system.
211(7) Company falsely claiming a person No comparable provision
is a director
213 Acting as director while not having The Act is silent on this matter,
the required qualification shares leaving both the question of qualifi-
cation shares, and the remedy, to be
set out in the Mol.
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215(5) Failure by company to keep a regis- The comparable provisions con-
216(5) ter of directors, provide notices of cerning keeping a register and filing
change to the registrar, and provide change notices are enforced by
access to the register compliance notice, while the
access requirements are
enforced by an offence provi-
sion. s 24(3)(b) and (5), read with
s 26.
218(2) Acting as a director while disquali- The comparable prohibition is
fled enforceable through a court appli-
cation to have the offending person
declared delinquent or under pro-
bation: s 69(2) to (4), read with
s 162.
219(5) Acting as a director in contraven- The comparable prohibition is
tion of a court order ofdelinquency enforceable by contempt proceed-
ings: s 162.
222(2) (a) Issuing of shares to director without The comparable provision is
shareholder approval enforceable by rendering the direc-
tors liable to the company: s 41,
read with s 77(3)(e)(ii).
226(4) () Issuing a loan to a director The comparable provision is
enforceable by rendering the direc-
tors liable to the company: s 45,
read with s 77(3)(e)(ii).
234(4) Failure by director to comply with The comparable provision is
237(5) duty to disclose personal financial enforceable by rendering the direc-
interests tors liable to the company: s 75,
read with s 77(2)(a).
238(2) Failure by company to provide No comparable provision
notice that a director has a personal
interest
239(3) Failure by company to adequately The comparable provision is
record in the minutes that a director enforceable through compliance
has a personal interest, notices. As well, the regulations
governing minutes could address
this point, bringing the matter
within the ambit ofs 24: s 73(6) and
(7).
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242 Failure to comply with other The comparable provision is
minute-keeping requirements enforceable through compliance
notices. As well, the regulations
governing minutes could address
this point, bringing the matter
within the ambit of s 24: s 73(6) and
(7).
245(3) Failure of company, director or No comparable obligation
officer to keep, or sign, attendance
register
249 Making a false statement Offence: s 214
249(2) Makinga false statement under oath Offence: s 215(2)(e)
250(1) Falsification of books or records Offence: s 28(3) and s 214(1)(a)
251(1) False statement on other written Offence: s 214
statements
252 Failure to comply with obligation The comparable obligation is
to file a court order with registrar enforceable by compliance notice:
s 162(3).
253(2) Failure to comply with demand by No comparable power ofcoummis-
registrar relating to share transfers sion to make such a demand
255 Failure to comply with ministerial No comparable power in Minister.
demand for information However, generally, it is an
offence to hinder the adminis-
tration of the Act: s 215.
256(5) Acting contrary to a Minister's No comparable power in Minister
256(6) notice imposing restrictions on
share transfers
260(4) Failure to attend when summoned, Offence: ss 176 to 179, read with
or otherwise hinder investigation s 215(1) and (2)(d) to (g).
268C(3) Failure to appoint company Secre- Comparable provision is enforce-
268C(6) tary able through compliance notice
system: s 86(1).
268H(2) Failure to print name of secretary of No comparable obligation
company documents
2681(5) Failure to file notice of change of Comparable obligation is enforce-
company secretary able through compliance notice
system: s 85(3).
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269(5) Failure to appoint auditor Comparable provision is enforce-
able through compliance notice
system: s 86(1).
271 Failure to notify registrar of failure No comparable obligation
to appoint auditor
275(4) Acting as an auditor while disquali- Disqualification in terms ofprofes-
fled sional standing is now regulated
through Auditing Profession Act.
Disqualification in terms of rela-
tionship to company is enforceable
through compliance notice system:
s90(2).
276 Failure to notify registrar ofchanges Comparable obligation is enforce-
in auditor able through compliance notice
system: s 85(3).
284(4)(a) Failure to comply with obligations Offence to fail to keep proper
respecting accounting records accounting records with intent
to deceive or mislead: s 28(3).
286(4)(a) Failure to comply with obligations Offence to produce false or mis-
respecting annual financial state- leading statements. Other
ments requirements enforceable through
compliance notice: ss 29(6) and 30
287 Issue ofincomplete financial state- Offence to produce false or mis-
ments leading statements: s 29(6)
287A {CLAA} Production of false or misleading Offence to produce false or mis-
financial reports leading statements: s 29(6)
288(a) Failure to comply with require- Offence to produce false or mis-
ments for group financial statements leading statements. Other
requirements enforceable through
compliance notice: ss 29(6) and 30
291(4) Failure to exercise right to apply to The Act enforces statutory obliga-
registrar for an exemption from tions, not optional rights.
group reporting requirements
295(a) Failure to have AFS disclose loans to The comparable requirements
directors are enforceable under the gen-
eral offence provisions relating
to misleading financial state-
ments: s 29(6), read with s 30(4)
and (5).
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297(9) Failure by directors to provide rel- The comparable obligation is
evant information to auditor enforceable by direct application by
the auditor to the high court:
s 93(1)(a) and (2).
298 Circulation of an unsigned AFS The comparable obligation is
enforceable through the compli-
ance notice system: s 30(3)(c).
299(3) Failure to include a Director's The comparable obligation is
report with the AFS enforceable through the compli-
ance notice system: s 30(3)(b).
300A {CLAA} Failure by auditor to comply with No comparable provisions, as regu-
requirements to attend meetings lation and discipline of auditors
now falls under Auditing Profes-
sions Act
302 Failure to provide copy ofAFS as Comparable provisions are
required enforceable by offence provi-
sions: s 31, read with 24(3)(c),
s 26.
308 Failure to comply with require- Comparable provisions are
ments relating to interim or provi- enforceable by offence provi-
sions financial reports sions in s 29(6), which applies
to all financial statements.
309 Failure to provide copy ofAFS to Comparable provisions are
persons entitled to it enforceable by offence provi-
sions: s 31, read with s 24(3)(c),
s 26.
311(7) Failure to annex court order of Comparable requirements are
scheme of arrangement to all subse- enforceable through the compli-
quent copies of memorandum or ance notice system: s 155(7).
articles
312(4) Failure to provide required infor- Comparable notice requirements
mation to creditors with respect to are enforceable through creditors'
proposed scheme of arrangement right to apply to court at any time:
s 155.
312(5) Failure by director or debenture No comparable obligation
holder to provide relevant infoana-
tion with respect to a proposed
scheme of arrangement
432 MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
1973 1973 Act Offence 2008 Companies Act
Companies Act
313(3) Failure by company to file a copy of Comparable requirements are
court order with registrar. enforceable through compliance
notice: s 155(7).
333(1) 333(2) Failure of external company, its Comparable provisions enforced
officers and directors to register and through specific compliance notice,
comply with obligations and administrative cease trading
order: s 23(6).
356 Failure by company to give Procedures are slightly modified,
required notice of resolution to such that the winding-up does not
voluntarily wind up commence until the notice is filed
with the commission, and it is the
commission who notifies the
Master, and the Master publishes a
Gazette notice: s 80, read with
s357.
357 363 363A(2) Matters regarding winding up Partially preserved
365 414(3)
418 421(8) 425
424(3) Reckless conduct of business Comparable prohibition enforce-
able by show-cause notice, and
cease trading order: s 22
440D(3) Failure to attend when summoned Offence: s 215(2)
by Panel
440D(4) Offence: s 215 (2)
4401(2) Covered by general offence pro-
vision for breach of confidence:
s 213
440CC {CLAA} Confidentiality of matters before Covered by general offence pro-
SRP vision for breach of confidence:
s 213
440FF {CLAA} Issuance of financial report that fails Offence if false or misleading.
to comply with reporting standards Otherwise enforceable by compli-
ance notice: s 29(6)
